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This study is conducted to examine the extent of capital mobility and financial 
integration in the Asia Pacific region. First, the Feldstein-Horioka approach is adopted 
to determine the capital mobility among the US, Japan and eight Asia Pacific 
countries. Second, the Real Interest Parity is employed to examine the financial 
integration amongst these countries. To capture the effect of fmancial liberalisation on 
these countries, the sample period is divided into two sub-periods, the pre- (1971:Q 1-
1983:Q4) and the post-liberalisation era (1984:Ql-2000:Q3). All empirical evidences 
are demonstrated through the application of cointegration tests, Granger-causality, 
Variance Decompositions (VDCs) and Impulse Response Functions (IRFs). 
The indications of non-co integrated and inactive of causality chains of saving-
investment relationships have provided sufficient evidence for the high capital 
mobility for all studied countries (including the United States and Japan) in both long 
run and short run. These findings are thus not supporting the argument which claimed 
that the saving-investment relationship is only applicable for small open countries. 
Hence, the failure of most previous researchers to establish such results may therefore 
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reflect the method used rather than any inherent deficiency in the saving-investment 
relationship. Moreover, improper treatment of non-stationarity variables may yield 
results that are less favourable to long run relationship between the two aggregates. 
Results of real interest parity have indicated the dynamic causal linkages and greater 
financial integration amongst Asia Pacific countries during the post-liberalisation era. 
Relative active Granger-causal chains and the VDCs results have also demonstrated 
that ASEAN-5 are more interdependent among themselves as compared to the whole 
region. In addition, Singapore is found statistically endogenous in the multivariate 
system during post liberalisation, for both ASEAN-5 and the Asia Pacific-l0 model. 
This would imply that Singapore has been a vulnerable (to the world market) but very 
competitive and efficient financial centre since 198 0s. Moreover, the results of VDCs 
and IRFs have confirmed that the movements of real interest rates in Asia Pacific 
countries are mainly driven by both the US and Japan. However, the US market has 
much more dominance power than Japan, implying that Japan has not overtaken the 
role of US in the Asia Pacific regional fmancial market. 
Increased capital mobility and high regional financial integration have always entailed 
with large capital inflows into the developing Asia Pacific countries. Despite the 
potential welfare gained, capital inflows are most likely associated with monetary and 
price instability, contagion effects and speculative investments. Hence, the capital­
coping strategies and capital market restructuring will be the key interest for regional 
policy makers. Also, to provide a collective defense mechanism against systemic 
failure and monetary instability, this study proposes the Asia Pacific Optimal 
Currency Area. 
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Kajian ini dijalankan untuk menentukan tahap mobiliti modal dan integrasi kewangan 
di rantau Asia Pasifik. Bahagian pertama kajian menggunakan kaedah Feldstein-
Horioka untuk menyiasat tahap mobiliti modal antara Amerika Syarikat, Jepun and 
lapan negara Asia Pasifik dari segi hubungan tabungan-pelaburan. Bahagian kedua 
pula membekalkan bukti-bukti mengenai integrasi kewangan serantau melalui aplikasi 
Pariti ¥'...adar Faedah Sebenar. Demi mengesani impak liberalisasi kewangan, tempoh 
kajian telah dibahagikan kepada pra-liberalisasi ( 197 1 :Ql-1 983:Q4) dan selepas-
liberalisasi ( 1984:Ql-2000:Q3). Kesemua keputusan empirikal ini ditunjukkan 
melalui ujian-uj ian kointegrasi, penyebab-Granger, Dekomposisi Varians (DKs) dan 
Fungsi Tindak Balas (FTB). 
Penemuan hubungan tanpa kointegrasi serta penyebab-Granger yang tidak aktif antara 
tabungan-pelaburan mencadangkan mobiliti modal yang tinggi wujud (baik dalam 
jangka panjang atau jangka pendek) bagi 10  negara yang dikaji, termasuk ASEAN-5, 
NIE-3, Jepun dan Amerika Syarikat. Ini jelasnya tidak menyokong kajian-kajian lepas 
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yang mengatakan bahawa model hubungan tabungan-pelaburan hanya sesuai untuk 
negara terbuka yang kecil. Dalam pada itu, kegagalan para penyelidik untuk 
menunjukkan peningkatan mobiliti modal sedunia adalah disebabkan penggunaan 
kaedah penganggaran ekonometrik yang kurang sesuai. Sifat kepegunan angkubah 
juga perlu diambilkira demi menjelaskan hubungan tabungan dan pelaburan. 
Keputusan Pariti Kadar Faedah Sebenar pula mencadangkan bahawa pasaran-pasaran 
kewangan serantau Asia Pasifik adalah berintegrasi khasnya selepas liberalisasi. 
Daripada itu, ASEAN-5 didapati lebih berintegrasi antara mereka sendiri berbanding 
dengan serantau Asia Pasifik. Antara semua, Singapura didapati paling endogen, 
mencadengkan bahawa pasaran kewangan Singapura adalah amat cekap dari segi 
daya persaingan sejak 1980-an walaupun terdedah kepada pasaran dunia. Tambahan 
juga, penemuan melalui DKs dan FTB mengenalpasti bahawa US secara relatifnya 
mendominasikan pasaran kewangan Asia Pasifik berbanding dengan Jepun. Maka, 
kajian penyelidik-penyelidik yang menyatakan bahawa peranan Jepun dalam serantau 
Asia PasifIk telah mendahului Amerika Syarikat adalah tidak disokong. 
Peneml!an mobiliti modal yang tinggi serta integrasi kewangan serantau menimbulkan 
prihatin terhadap impak-impak pengaliran modal antarabangsa ke negara-negara Asia 
Pasifik yang sedang membangun. Selain faedah yang dinikmati seperti peningkatan 
pelaburan dan pembangunan ekonomi, pengaliran masuk modal turnt disertai kesan 
kontagion dan masalah kestabilan kewangan. Justeru itu, strategi-strategi pengurusan 
modal antarabangsa dan penstrukturan semula pasaran kewangan domestik 
seharusnya menjadi perhatian utama pengubal polisi. Kesemuan ini membawa kepada 
penimbangan Matawang Optimal Serantau Asia Pasifik pada masa depan. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s as we remember, was a decade of rapid integration of financial 
markets in the industrialized world and the OECDsl. For most developing countries, 
financial reforms started since late 1980s and the liberalisation process is getting even 
more rapid in the 1990s2• In line with the increasing liberalizing of capital accounts, 
globalization of trade and fmancial deregulation has also been claimed to be the main 
generator of sustainable growth in most emerging markets including Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, South Korea and ASEAN-5 for the past two decades. 
Net private capital flows to developing countries tripled from $50 billion per 
year during 1987-89 to more than $150 billion per year during 1995-1997. Also, 
foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries had accounted for US$ 
207.6 billion in 1999 (see Table 1.4). Meanwhile, the ratio of private capital flows to 
domestic investment in developing countries increased to 20% in 1996 from only 3% 
in 1990. Despite the economic liberalization, rapid growth of international capital 
flows is also driven by revolutionary changes in information and communication 
technologies, which have transformed the financial services industry worldwide. 
Computer links enable investors to access information on asset prices at minimal cost 
on a real-time basis, while increased computing power enables them to rapidly 
1 See Lemmen and Eijffinger (1993, 1995) for a comprehensive survey on European Community and 
OECDs while Frankel (1993) on 25 both developed and developing countries. 
2 Applying Uncovered Interest Parity, Hong (2000) found increased capital mobility for 7 Asian 
countries. In addition, Phylaktis (1999) found extensive real interest rate linkages among 5 developing 
Asia Pacific countries with world financial markets, implying a high degree of financial integration in 
the region. 
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calculate on correlations among asset prices and between asset prices and other 
variables. Thus, it is becoming more difficult for government to governance 
international capital flows. 
Conventional wisdoms tell us that financial liberalization and integration have 
contributed to higher investment, faster growth, and more efficient allocation of 
resources as well as better living standards. Several economic thoughts in the 1990s 
suggest that capital inflows may lead to harmful outcomes if distorted by incomplete 
information, which further lead to problems of adverse selection, moral hazard and 
herding behaviour. At least, such asymmetries can lead to inefficiencies; in extreme, 
they may lead to costly fmancial crisis such as the current Asia fmancial crisis (see 
Eichengreen et al. , 1999). 
The Asian currency crisis erupted with the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 
1997. In the 18 months that have followed, the contagion effects of currency crisis 
have spread throughout Asia Pacific and triggered fmancial crisis. Both Japan and the 
US, who are very close to the Asian economies, are also affected by the crisis. In 
Indonesia, it has even escalated into political and social crisis. From its vaunted status 
as 'the world's growth center', Asia has suddenly been transformed into the epicenter 
ofa global economic meltdown) (see Table 1.1). 
J During 1998, due to the impact of the financial crisis, the Asian economies deteriorated with each 
successive quarter. Its effects included declines in domestic demand factors, such as consumption and 
investment, as well as stagnating exports. The situation became increasingly serious during 1 999 where 
some Asian economies experienced substantial negative growth, as reported by the Center for Pacific 
Business Studies (2000). 
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The Asian financial crisis has brought growing concern on the reforms of 
international financial system. Some crisis countries have blamed the international 
financial system that allows for speculation activities, has to great extent, contributed 
to the external vulnerability and financial crises. At the recent APEC (Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation) meetings, leaders have called for the creation of disclosure 
standards for short-term speculative funds, such as the hedge funds. They welcome 
any proposals that could protect emerging countries from the effects of sudden 
movements of short-term funds and currency attacks. Of all, economic regeneration 
and regional cooperation towards currency and financial stability will be emphasized. 
These Asia pacific countries are expected to adopt policies that would provide a 
collective mechanism against systemic failures and monetary instability, including a 
closer regional monetary cooperation and arrangements. 
Nevertheless, high regional fmancial integration and high capital mobility 
across .:-ach other are essential for countries that wish to establish closer regional 
cooperation and other regional monetary arrangements, such as the trade bloc or 
regional currency arrangement. These issues have thus motivated us to conduct this 
study on the extent of capital mobility and financial integration within the Pacific 
Rim. Although there have been studies on the regarding topic, most studies were 
based on the experiences of the developed countries such as the OECDs and the 
European community. This study is conducted to fill the research gap by giving 
special focus on the developing Asia-Pacific basin countries, including the ASEAN-5 
and three newly industrialized economies (NIEs) namely Taiwan, South Korea and 
Hong Kong. In addition, we also include the US and Japan to evaluate the relative 
influence of world economy on the Asia Pacific regional financial markets. 
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Capital Mobility 
Flows of capital between one country and others, include debt, portfolio equity 
and direct! real estate investment are recorded in the capital account of its balance of 
payments. Capital outflows include residents' purchases of foreign assets and 
repayment of foreign loans, whereas inflows include foreigners' investments in home­
country fmancial markets and property and loans to home-country residents. Free 
transaction of capital flows without restrictions among countries are thus named as 
capital account liberalization or sometime known as capital mobility. Capital mobility 
allows countries with limited savings to attract external sources for fmancing 
productive domestic investments. It also stimulates business cycles by allowing 
households and firms to continue buying and investing when domestic market fails to 
produce sufficient resources. By contrast, with lending money abroad, households and 
firms can reduce their vulnerability to domestic economic disturbances. Companies 
can thus protect themselves against sudden cost increases in home country, for 
instance by investing in foreign countries. In other word, this enables investors to 
achieve higher risk-adjusted rates of return. In turn, higher rates of return encourage 
saving and investment that generate faster economic growth. 
Free flows of international capital do not guarantee benefits. If a financial 
market is distorted by asymmetric information gap, that is one party of the financial 
transaction (lenders) has less information than other party (borrower), then an 
inefficient and unstable financial market would be expected. Three inefficient 
4 
PERPUSTAKAAN 
outcomes particular, which are moral hazard4, adveiS\SW�ifluf��ht\rYo�!A 
have always been associated with asymmetric information. At least, such asymmetries 
can lead to inefficiencies; in extreme, they will lead to costly financial crises. 
Moral hazard has been the major concern in developing countries by many 
critiques. This happens when investors are expecting governments to bail them out 
during financial crisis. This problem is usually caused by government guarantees for 
fmancial institutions in the absence of adequate safeguards or sufficient incentives for 
market discipline to police excessive risk-taking behaviour. With asymmetric 
information, a creditor may not be able to observe if a borrower will invest in a highly 
risk or risk-free project. In addition, if that borrower is protected by limited liability or 
guarantees, too many risky investments are to be expected since high returns are 
associated with high risk. For instance, companies or banks with negative worth 
borrow to gamble for redemption that is, invest in ventures with a high potential 
payoff (and thus potential rescue from bankruptcy) but a low probability of success. 
Over time, lenders will become more reluctant to make loans and the capitals being 
invested will be less than the amount that make sense from an economic perspective. 
Adverse selection occurs when lenders are willing to pay (lend money) a price 
for a security that reflects only the average quality of firms (borrower) issuing 
securities, knowing that they cannot fully evaluate the creditworthiness of each 
borrower due to asymmetric information. These of course are unfair to high quality 
4 The role of moral hazard in the onset of the Aian crisis 1997/98 has been stressed by a number of 
authors, namely Krugman (1998), Greenspan (1998), Fisher (1998) and, Sarno and Taylor (1999). 
According to them, before the Asian financial crisis, Asia leading national banks were excessively 
borrowing from abroad and lending excessively at home. These capitals have flowed to lots of risky 
and dubious profitable projects, which later put the investors! bankers into large debts and even 
bankruptcy when currency crisis occurred. 
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firms while low quality firms are benefited. Realizing that securities are undervalued 
(or, excessive borrowing cost) for high quality firm, fewer securities will be issued 
and many profitable projects will not be undertaken. By contrast, the less successful 
or even loss-making projects of low-quality firms will be financed. 
I Ierding behavior on the other hand occurs when lenders try to follow the lead 
of someone they believe to be better informed. In addition if investors are not alert of 
the quality of their fund manager, herding behavior may also happens. Low quality 
fund managers will find it rational to emulate the investment decisions of other 
managers. Thus herding makes sense when the payoff to an agent adopting an action 
increases because many other agents adopt the same action. For instance, individual 
currency traders may be too small to exhaust a central bank's reserves and force 
currenc�' devaluation, but simultaneous sales by several big traders can bring about 
such pressure, thus rewarding the first agent's decision to sell the cun·ency. Hence 
herding behavior of large amount of investors can amplify price movements and 
precipitate sudden crises. 
Financial Integration 
Perhaps the simplest approach to analyze the degree of market integration is 
the computing of the correlation between returns on those markets that are thought to 
be integrated. This approach is based on rather simple intuition: the more integrated 
markets are, the higher the co-movement between their prices. However, it is now 
well known that higher correlation is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
greater market integration. If markets are completely integrated and, therefore, there 
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are no arbitrage opportunities, returns on different assets can be divided into a 
common component and an idiosyncratic one. 
In addition, perfect cross-market integration is generally understood as a 
situation in which there is no barrier of any kind to cross-border fmancial transactions, 
such as tariffs, taxes, restrictions on the trading of foreign assets, information costs or 
any other cost that makes it more difficult to trade across countries than within them. 
With perfect cross-market integration there are no cross-market arbitrage 
opportunities and the law of one price (LOP) hold, i.e. portfolios with the same 
payoffs should have the same price in different markets. It is worth nothing, however, 
that, as suggested above, the LOP or the absence of arbitrage opportunities cannot be 
assessed from the analysis of the co-movement of the levels of financial asset prices 
or of their volatilities. 
As pointed by Shepherd (1994), fmancial integration can be explained in tenns 
of asset price, capital stock and flow adjustments. Arguably, the most theoretically 
satisfactory definition of fmancial integration is based on asset substitutability, on the 
LOP, whereby equal and free access to information equalizes returns on perfectly 
substitutable assets. Such asset substitution is dependent on the willingness of asset­
holders to exchange fmancial claims, but the presence of any barriers to trade in 
financial assets whether they are institutional, subjective or expectational, will ensure 
imperfe�t asset substitution. 
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Measurements of Capital Mobility and Financial Integration 
In general, there are three main criterions/approaches to measure international 
capital mobility and financial integration. First is the Interest Rate Parity (price 
approach), which include Covered Interest Parity (CIP), Uncovered Interest Parity 
(UIP) and Real Interest Parity (RIP). Second is the well known but controversial 
Feldstein-Horioka approach (quantity approach) and the third one is the Consumption 
Smoothing Approach. 
Covered Interest Parity (CIP) 
Covered Interest Parity (CIP) requires capital flows equalized interest rates 
across countries when contracted in a common currency (see Frankel, 1992). In other 
words, CIP holds if forward premium! discount equal the nominal interest differential 
at appropriate maturity. Lemmen and Eijffinger (1993, 1995) pointed out that CIP 
shows the ability of fmancial capital movements. In addition, the country premium 
captures the impact of actual and future capital controls, default risk and transaction 
cost. According to Moosa (1996), CIP only measure capital mobility in a narrow 
sense as it concerns with short-term capital movement. CIP thus is unlikely to hold in 
long-term capital due to the unavailability of long-term forward contracts. 
Uncovered Interest Parity (UlP) 
Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) on the other hand requires capital flows 
equalized expected rates of returns on countries' bonds, regardless of exposure to 
exchange risk. UIP holds when expected nominal exchange rate change equalized the 
nominal interest differential at appropriate maturity. UIP takes the CIP assumption of 
8 
